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changing world economy 
INTRODUCTION 
The essays reproduced below were presented at a small, informal and high-level conference on 
the theme of "A New Latin America in a Changing World Economy" held at the Belmont 
Conference Center near Washington D.C. on 25-26 June 1979. 
The purpose of the conference —organized jointly by the Economic Commission for Latin 
America (CEPAL) and the Latin American Program of the Woodrow Wilson International Center 
for Scholars— was to facilitate a full and frank exchange of views among key scholars and officials 
interested, from a variety of different perspectives, in Latin America's evolving international 
economic and political roles. All participants were invited in their personal capacities, and not in 
representation of their respective organizations. 
The discussion was informal and free of official statements, in order to stimulate an open and 
constructive dialogue. The focus of the discussion was provided by a series of short papers on 
specific issues; namely, exports of manufactures, exports of primary products, international 
monetary reform, capital flows and debt, transnational corporations and technological transfers, 
and the distributional impact of international economic reforms. Each of the corresponding 
papers is printed below in this issue of the Review. 
A key concern of all the papers and of the ensuing dialogue was to identify, in the most specific 
terms possible, areas of actual or prospective mutual interests between the countries of Latin 
America and the more industrialized countries, including but not limited to the United States. A 
separate though related objective was to help sketch out those kinds of policies, both within Latin 
America and vis-à-vis the industrialized countries, which might serve to reinforce those shared 
interests. 
An underlying purpose of the conference was to determine to what extent the future role of 
Latin America in the world economy depends on changes in the external environment, including 
in particular those affected by policies in the industrialized countries. However, although the 
main focus of the discussion was on external forces and relations, consideration was also given to 
certain key internal trends and policies. A report on the conference, prepared by the rapporteur in 
his own name, synthesizes and analyses the central elements of the conference dialogue and 
outlines some of the more organic relationships linking those various elements. 
The conference was chaired by Mr. Enrique Iglesias (Executive Secretary of CEPAL) and by 
Dr. Abraham F. Lowenthal (of the Wilson Center). The rapporteur was Professor Colin Bradford 
(Assistant Director, Concilium on International and Area Studies, Yale University). The 
conference was organized jointly by Professor Lowenthal and Mr. David H. Pollock (Director, 
CEPAL Washington Office). Grateful acknowledgement is made to Mr. Marco Pollner, Mrs. Ana 
Ormerod and Mrs. Patricia Pilvin of the CEPAL Washington Office, Miss Sallie Mitchell of the 
Woodrow Wilson Center, and the staff at the Belmont Center, for all they did to make this meeting 
so successful. Special thanks are due to the World Bank and the US Agency for International 
Development for their financial contributions which made the meeting possible. 
The Woodrow Wilson Center and CEPAL are very pleased to have had this opportunity to 
co-operate so closely in such a fruitful exchange of views. 
Abraham F. Lowenthal David H. Pollock 
(Woodrow Wilson Center) (CEPAL) 
T h e Export of Manufactures 
Pedro I. Mendive* 
Introduction 
The development of the manufacturing sector 
has an important role to play in Latin America 
in relation to a long list of economic variables, 
all of which aim at changing the economic 
characteristics of the region in aspects such as 
the diversification of production, structure of 
employment and production, growth of income 
and the average wage, and attenuation of the 
fluctuations in prices and export earnings, as 
will be seen in the following pages. Hence all 
measures tending to develop and consolidate 
this sector, whether through import substi-
tution or exports of manufactures, merit spe-
cial attention in the economic policy of the 
Latin American countries and the developing 
countries in general. 
This study comprises four parts: (i) the first 
shows the important effect of exports of manu-
factures by the developing world on those and 
other related economic variables; (ii) the sec-
ond considers the supply conditions —relative 
availability of factors, technological level and 
goals— and their international comparative 
advantages in certain sectors, export promotion 
policies and production incentives, etc.; (iii) 
from an analytical point of view, a study is made 
of the conditions of access to the industrialized 
countries' markets (demand), considering the 
existing protectionism, generalized systems of 
preferences (GSP) and the multilateral trade 
negotiations {Tokyo Round) which have just 
ended, together with an evaluation and quanti-
fication of their results as far as conditions ol 
access to the developed countries' markets are 
concerned; and (iv) the lines of action to adopt 
in accordance with the results of the analysis 
under points (i) to (iii) above. 
I 
Importance of exports of manufactures for 
the Latin American economy 
Simultaneous and parallel policies of exports 
of manufactures versus the production of man-
ufactured goods to substitute for imports, i.e., 
production for domestic consumption, tend to 
be regarded as conflicting or at least incompati-
ble. It is further argued along the same lines 
that one dollar of export receipts is exactly the 
same as a dollar not spent abroad on imports. 
In actual fact, according to this sector's evolu-
tion in the developing countries, the majority 
began with import substitution and advanced 
subsequently along the road to exports of 
manufactures. The difference between the 
*Former Assistant Executive Secretary of CEPAL. 
policies followed in the various countries lies 
in the fact that some countries, after substi-
tuting imports of the "easier" goods —pro-
duced with high labour intensity, little capital, 
simple technology and a wide supply of cheap 
inputs— immediately went on to the export 
stage, while other countries continued with 
import substitution covering more complex 
goods —produced with higher capital intensity 
and advanced technology. This difference in 
industrialization policies often depended on 
the compressible margin offered by the re-
spective import structures; when the wide 
substitutable margin of some countries had 
been covered, they went on to exports, while 
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those with a small easily substitutable margin 
continued to substitute more complex goods 
for imports. In the first case, the relative aban-
donment of any further progress in import 
substitution seems to have been due to the 
taking of a decision concerning the option 
raised by the availability or otherwise of basic 
inputs, the attitude being that although their 
purchase abroad might subject the supply of 
these inputs to the fluctuations of the interna-
tional market and to the purchasing power of 
the country concerned, domestic production 
of such inputs would have made them more 
expensive, with adverse repercussions on the 
cost of the finished goods. In contrast, the 
second case seems to have been guided by the 
decision to reach more advanced levels of 
technology and to economize on relatively 
scarce external purchasing power. 
This brings to mind a number of differ-
ences between exports and import substitution 
which may be summed up as follows: (i) ex-
ports require a comparative or competitive 
advantage (better resource allocation and 
bigger scales of production, and often promo-
tional measures as well); (ii) the substitution 
of imports by domestic production of more 
difficult procurement requires, at least ini-
tially, a variable degree of protection; (iii) ex-
ports, however, also require a higher level of 
entrepreneurial and manpower training, more 
suitable techniques and a different and more 
complex infrastructure. 
Turning once again to exports of manufac-
tures, it will be seen that they produce ampli-
fied positive effects on the sector in two dif-
ferent ways: through inter-industry relations 
—input-output— which disseminate them 
throughout the manufacturing sector itself and 
to other sectors of the economy, and through 
the increase in demand represented by the 
addition of external demand to domestic 
demand. 
If exports are initially confined to labour-
intensive goods, there is a saving in the use of 
capital —a relatively scarce factor in the devel-
oping economies which will thus be free for 
expanding the sector or for use in other sectors 
of the economy. 
As the manufactured goods exported be-
come more complex, however, requirements 
in terms of capital and the use of advanced 
technologies become greater, all of which 
increasingly reduces the absorption of man-
power and tends towards the production of 
capital-intensive goods. This represents an 
apparent dilemma. If the introduction of im-
proved production techniques and the conse-
quent use of capital in the primary sectors 
—agriculture and mining— save labour and the 
same situation arises in the complex industry, 
the conclusion would seem to be contrary to 
the economic and social interests of the devel-
oping countries. It should be remembered that 
the relative supply of factors in these countries 
is characterized by plentiful manpower and a 
shortage of capital. 
This criterion should, however, be mod-
ified in the light of other factors such as the 
expansion —through new branches of produc-
tive industry— and growth of the whole sector 
(including of course that of capital-intensive 
industries), to which should be added the 
employment promoted or induced in other 
independent but related activities, such as 
marketing, financing, export and other services 
and in particular, the rise in personal income 
determined by this process, which should lead 
to considerable growth of tertiary sector activi-
ties which do not represent disguised unem-
ployment but are of a really productive nature. 
This process is characteristic of sustained de-
velopment and is the employment structure 
displayed —not only at the present time— by 
the industrialized countries. 
In other words, a general rise in wages (in 
real terms) takes place in the sector and in the 
economy in general, and this process may 
even induce or promote a less regressive 
distribution of domestic income, and even of 
world income on the basis of exports which, 
though still competitive, have a larger content of 
increasing wage rates vis-à-vis those prevail-
ing in the developed countries. At the start of 
the process there would probably be —as there 
were in Japan— two parallel labour markets, 
one with depressed wages —for labour-inten-
sive industries using simple technology— and 
another with high wages for the great dynamic 
industries. As the process advances, however, 
the wage rates would gradually converge at 
increasingly high levels. 
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It is now necessary to take into account the 
fact that the prices of manufactured goods are 
subject in the world economy, and particularly 
in international trade, to a certain generally 
upward stable trend in keeping with the course 
of world inflation: a situation which does not 
occur over the long term in commodity trade, 
characterized as the latter is by big fluctuations. 
The assumed development of the manufac-
turing sector and exports of manufactures by 
developing countries would thus have the 
virtue of reducing the fluctuations in world 
commodity prices and, therefore, in earnings 
from total exports. 
Within the context of these general aspects 
and considerations with respect to the advis-
ability of" exporting (and therefore producing) 
manufactured goods, there remains to be con-
sidered the correlation that may exist between 
the growth of such exports and the growth of 
the gross product. It may be noted that there 
are two different positions in this respect. 
The first denies the validity of such a 
correlation, holding that manufactures 
—whether or not exported— are included 
As noted earlier, the relative availability of 
factors in the Latin American countries, and in 
all developing countries in general, is charac-
terized by a relatively greater supply of labour 
than of capital. At the same time, their present 
production structure reveals a predominance 
of primary commodities, whether of agricul-
tural, livestock or mining origin. This means 
that, still in relative terms, wages and many 
inputs are cheap and capital is expensive. 
Accordingly, in the secondary sectors (manu-
facturing and others) goods produced with the 
use of the more abundant factor are in an ex-
cellent competitive position, in both the do-
mestic and the international economy. It 
should be noted that this is so, notwithstanding 
the fact that the physical productivity of man-
power in the industrialized economies is 
among the data on the gross product considered 
in this correlation, thus invalidating the results 
from the start. 
The second position, based on empirical 
observations on the evolution of exports of 
manufactures by various developing countries 
which considerably expanded their manufac-
turing sector and exports, concludes that such 
a correlation is clearly and conceptually valid. 
If the general formula for the gross product 
is: 
GNP - C + I + X - M 
where C = consumption, 
I = investment, 
X = exports and 
M = imports, 
there is no reason why any growth which 
occurs in X owing to an increase in exports of 
manufactures (or of any other kind of goods) 
should affect C and I directly, and it would 
affect M only to a minor extent on account of 
imports of certain inputs and capital goods, so 
it is not difficult to conclude arithmetically that 
the gross product must inevitably increase.1 
greater than in the developing countries, be-
cause such greater physical productivity fails 
to compensate for the low wages paid in the 
developing countries. 
The proportion accounted for by raw 
materials in the final price of manufactures 
where Latin America has a clear competitive 
advantage is also lower in the region. This is 
due to two circumstances. On the one hand, 
the inputs in these exported products have a 
high nationally-produced content, and on the 
other, these nationally-produced inputs also 
AThe growth of the GNP will give rise to an increase 
in imports through the well-known mechanism of the 
external trade multiplier (k), but this is merely a conse-
quence of the increase occurring first in the GNP owing 
to the growth of exports. 
II 
Supply conditions 
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have a high labour content, the cost of which 
is between 20% and 30% of the total price of 
the raw material used. Likewise, the low wage 
costs included in these inputs are not neutral-
ized by the greater physical productivity of 
labour in the developed countries. 
A study carried out by the author of this 
document? shows that for the same goods 
exported by the* United States, Argentina, 
Brazil and Chile, the number of times the unit 
of wages produces value added is a good deal 
lower in the United States. Thus while in 
Argentina one unit of wages produces 3.77 
units of value added, in the United States it 
produces only 2.18. Compared with Brazil, 
these figures are 3.33 and 2.02, and in the 
comparison with Chile the contrast is between 
3.9 and 2 units of value added. 
Furthermore, technology today —subject 
to certain conditions and limits— is within the 
reach of every country, thus providing opti-
mum conditions for the production and export 
of such goods. 
As regards the more complex manufactures 
produced with more advanced and sophis-
ticated technology, some favourable factors 
still persist, but the competitiveness gap tends 
to narrow. Frequently this narrowing of the 
competitive margin is due to the fact that the 
development of such lines of production 
requires, in addition to considerable scales 
of production, certain special basic and inter-
mediate inputs which can be obtained in Latin 
America and other developing countries only 
at a not very favourable cost. Thus, in order to 
overcome this obstacle or stumbling-block, 
two opposing policies may be followed, lead-
ing to different results. One policy is to produce 
these inputs locally, which means a varying 
degree of protectionism and domestic produc-
tion subsidies that obviously make the cost of 
the input produced in the country higher than 
the similar imported input without the protec-
tion obstacle (i.e., unless the subsidy cancels 
2Pedro I. Mendive, document on the identification of 
non-tariff barriers for the Tokyo Round negotiations pre-
sented at the seminar on the Multilateral Trade Negotia-
tions held in Guatemala in October 1976 under the 
auspices of SIECA and the CEPAL/UNCTAD/UNDP 
Interregional Project. 
out the difference in costs). If this is the case, 
the well-known action of the formula of the 
effective rate of protection for production 
factors will mean that such a policy, in the 
absence of special internal defences, will act 
as a tax on the location of the activity producing 
the final good in the economy of the developing 
country concerned. The defence measures 
against this implicit tax will lead to drastic 
changes in certain internal variables, whose 
nature and effects are easy to foresee. 
The other policy —aimed at overcoming 
the obstacle represented by the high cost of the 
input concerned— lies in importing such 
inputs under very low customs tariffs, while 
levying high customs tariffs on the final goods 
produced from them. The result will be that 
the effective rate of protection for domestic 
factors of production of the final good will be 
much higher than the nominal rate and will 
act as a subsidy for the location of such activity 
in the developing country. If there is no pos-
sibility of this domestic production being car-
rried out in the future in an economic manner, 
an inefficient production enclave would be 
created which would lead to higher prices for 
the final goods produced there. On the other 
hand, if such production could eventually be 
carried out economically, the final goods pro-
duced with such inputs would be competitive 
both domestically (with respect to other activ-
ities) and on the world market. 
The export of manufactures, as may be 
inferred from these observations, constitutes 
something in the nature of the last link in the 
chain which starts with production for import 
substitution. For the full development of this 
process it has become imperative for the devel-
oping countries to adopt policies such as —to 
mention only a few— incentives for the pro-
duction of final goods, special treatment for 
certain inputs, the establishment of credit, 
insurance and other instruments: in short, 
everything that makes up a complete and well-
structured export promotion policy. 
If the various measures composing these 
policies are classified by subject or area of 
competence, two clearly defined groups of 
measures or instruments may be established: 
incentives for the production of export goods, 
and incentives for export activity itself. 
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In the first group, special mention may be 
made of the following instruments: 
— elimination or reduction of import tar-
iffs on inputs and capital goods; 
— elimination of taxes on production 
financing; 
— elimination or reduction of taxes on 
energy used in the production of export goods; 
— extension of credit in respect of income 
tax on the export part of production; 
— use of the "draw-back" system for 
capital goods and inputs; 
— financing and reduction of the interest 
rates applicable to export production; 
— differential treatment for the transport 
of export goods; 
— direct subsidies for the production of 
export items. 
In the second group of measures, i.e., 
those aimed at promoting export activity, the 
following may be mentioned: 
— total or partial refunds or exemptions in 
respect ofdomestic taxes on exported products; 
— export credit financing; 
— export credit insurance; 
— refund or reimbursement of foreign 
exchange, operating like a differential ex-
change rate; 
— special export programmes; 
— direct export subsidies. 
It is not necessary to analyse these mea-
sures since, besides the fact that the machinery 
for their implementation is well known, their 
economic effects on the domestic economy 
and exports are also common knowledge. It is, 
however, important to offer some comments 
on the developed countries' opposition to their 
implementation by the developing countries. 
A number of non-tariff measures have 
gradually been included in the long-estab-
lished protectionist structure with the aim of 
impeding the access of developing countries' 
goods to the developed countries' markets. 
Two of these measures which are covered by 
articles VI, XII and XIX of GATT have par-
ticular relevance to this rejection, however. 
Although these two measures —safeguard 
clauses and countervailing duties— are regu-
lated in those articles, the truth is that —be-
sides being more numerous than before— their 
current implementation by the developed 
countries does not conform to the provisions 
of those articles, either in procedure or as 
regards their justification. In the case of safe-
guard clauses, no proof is provided of the 
serious damage referred to in article XIX, 
while in the case of countervailing duties, not 
only are these imposed arbitrarily and without 
such proof, but the threat of imposing them is 
used to discourage existing and planned ex-
ports of goods to those markets. 
The present situation of the world econo-
my differs substantially from that existing 
during most of the past century and the first 
decade of the present one, in that at that time 
the basic characteristics of the international 
division of labour were in force and restrictions 
on trade practically consisted only of tariff 
barriers. This was merely the result of the fact 
that the world economy was composed, on the 
one hand, of a few developed countries re-
quiring raw materials and consumer markets, 
which not only produced a wide range of 
manufactured goods but, in their capacity of 
exporters of capital, facilitated the exploitation 
of the natural resources they needed from the 
other group of countries, which were far more 
numerous and were barely in the incipient 
stages of development. Of course, while the 
small group of industrialized countries achiev-
ed rapid development on the basis of diversi-
fied production through progress in manufac-
turing, the other more numerous group was 
developing on the basis of the exploitation of a 
few primary commodities. The balance-of-
payments capital account of these countries 
—fed by increasing external investment— 
permitted not only the development of these 
resources but also payment for the necessary 
goods they imported from the more developed 
countries, as well as the remittance of returns 
on such investment. This international division 
of labour was partly based —rightly or wrong-
ly— on a certain comparative advantage which 
some countries possessed in the production of 
certain goods in relation to other countries, 
but for some years past, a radical change has 
been taking place in the pattern of international 
comparative advantages. Formerly, only one 
or two countries were little by little attaining a 
higher level of development based on progress 
in manufacturing, not only supplying the 
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domestic market but also gradually gaining 
external markets too. In an expanding world 
economy, where many developing countries 
were in need of those types of products, this 
did not lead in practice to any disturbance in 
the world economy and trade. 
In the last few years, however, this process 
has spread at a rapid and increasing rate to a 
large number of developing countries which 
have suddenly appeared on the world scene as 
exporters of a wide range of manufactured 
goods, produced advantageously on the basis 
of high labour-intensity, manpower being their 
most abundant factor. 
This latter fact, coupled with the false 
argument concerning the alleged starvation 
wages which, according to the developed 
countries, are paid in the developing econo-
mies, is used to justify the adoption of protec-
tionist measures, when the real grounds are 
the policies aimed at promoting exports of 
manufactures adopted by the developing 
countries.3 
In reality, when the competitive lines of 
production achieved by the developing coun-
tries run into barriers like those described 
above and the whole protectionist system 
which will be referred to later, the only way 
to surmount this obstacle to trade created by 
the developed world is to adopt subsidies and 
other incentives for the production and export 
of such goods. This is very far from being an 
unacceptable attitude, since all that the devel-
oping countries are trying to achieve in this 
way is to neutralize the unfair treatment meted 
out to their products by the developed coun-
tries. There is also the principle of infant 
industries, which is an argument or policy 
already applied in the past by the developed 
countries themselves, notably the United 
States. 
Mention may now be made of another 
difficulty in addition to those alluded to above, 
which in its own way prevents the goods of 
3 T h e wages and interest paid in developing economies 
derive from the marginal productivity of labour and capital, 
which is determined (in the Marshallian sense) by the 
relative supply of those factors of production. Thus in 
Latin America wages are low and capital is expensive, 
which is the precise opposite of what occurs in the devel-
oped world. 
certain complex capital-intensive industries 
from increasing their competitiveness on the 
external market. This is the existence of trans-
national corporations in certain manufacturing 
sectors using advanced technologies which, 
however, are often outmoded in the centres 
and are transferred in the form of plant which 
is technically obsolete in the country of origin. 
A first difficulty lies in the fact that these 
industries use inputs produced by the parent 
companies, which are usually imported at 
higher than market prices. Another difficulty 
arises out of the imposition of bans on compet-
ing with the parent company, either because of 
the geographical distribution of the market 
established by the centres or for other easily 
imaginable reasons. 
These sectors are therefore restricted to 
the domestic market of the developing coun-
tries in which they are established, or at best 
to exporting to the developing markets of 
neighbouring countries. 
Furthermore, the trade links established 
between imports and exports of inputs and 
final goods usually obscure the real prices, 
profits, taxes, etc., thus hindering the harmo-
nious development of a series of activities 
relating to the sector and preventing normal 
tax collection. 
Even so, Latin America is exporting con-
siderable quantities of goods to the world 
market, as may be seen from table 1. 
Table 1 
EXPORTS OF MANUFACTURES (EXCLUDING 
OIL AND NON-FERROUS METALS) BY SOME 
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III 
Conditions of access in the developed world 
While a long series of manufactures from 
developing already have a definitive competi-
tive advantage in international circles, e.g., 
textiles and clothing, footwear, leather articles 
and leatherwear, processed foods, some 
chemicals, and some electronic parts, com-
ponents and products, a whole list of other 
goods produced by light industries, and even 
some produced by heavier industries, justify 
the policies applied by these countries to 
promote the development of industry and the 
export of their products. 
In a supply situation with these charac-
teristics, however, manufactures do not have 
the same advantages as regards the conditions 
of access offered by the markets of the devel-
oped countries. Indeed, such access is meagre, 
and recent trends unfortunately confirm that 
it is becoming increasingly precarious, in other 
words, markets are increasingly hermetic. 
First of all, the tariffs of the developed 
countries have an average weighted rate of 
less that 10%. This is due to two main facts 
which explain why it is deceptive to limit 
oneself to this one simple average in analysing 
the tariff system. Nearly 40% of their imports 
enter these countries duty-free, a situation 
which was brought about during the various 
rounds of negotiations within GATT. These 
duty-free imports, however, are in their im-
mense majority imports of products which it 
is in the interest of the developed countries to 
trade on an international scale, but which are 
of little interest to the developing countries. 
Moreover, there are extraordinarily large de-
viations from this rate which affect products of 
export interest to the developing countries. 
The structure of the tariff systems of the 
developed countries shows definite scaling of 
tariffs as a line of production advances in its 
degree or stage of processing. This means that 
the factors of production of the developed 
countries have an effective rate of protection 
which is in many cases over two or three times 
higher than that afforded by the nominal rate. 
In an earlier work by the author4 these 
effective rates were determined for the United 
States, the European Economic Community 
and Japan as regards the following groups of 
products: processed foods, textiles and cloth-
ing, light industries, and industries of greater 
complexity, including products of particular 
interest to Latin America. Table 2 gives an 
idea of the size of the effective average weight-
ed rates. There are many individual examples, 
such as butter in the Community (1,322.7%), 
refined cottonseed oil in the United States 
(465.9%) or cigarettes and cigars in Japan 
(405%), which show the incredible spread of 
these effective rates compared with the 
weighted average rate. 
Table 2 
EFFECTIVE RATE OF PROTECTION 
(Percentages) 
Group of products USA Japan EEC 
Processed foods 28 68 63 
Textiles and clothing 43 45 60 
Light industries 24 26 15 
Complex industries 16 22 22 
These high effective rates of protection 
warrant some comments. The first is that they 
act as a subsidy for locating the activities 
producing final goods in the protecting coun-
try. A second comment is that in the developed 
countries these rates cover up production ac-
tivities which are clearly inefficient both in 
comparison with similar activities abroad and 
with other local economic activities. They are 
protected from the former by tariff scaling, 
4Pedro I. Mendive, "Protectionism and develop-
ment", CEPAL Review, No. 6, second half of 1978. 
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while as for the latter, the remuneration of the 
factors of production employed in the activity 
protected may be said to tend to be equal to that 
of the factors employed in the efficient indus-
tries. The cost-structure inflation which may 
be observed nowadays in the developed world 
is partly the result of the effective rate of 
protection of inefficient industries and other 
non-tariff barriers which protect such indus-
tries from foreign competition and which will 
be analysed below. 
Thus, in addition to this tariff structure, 
and even more important, are the non-tariff 
barriers. As well as the recent increase in the 
variety of types of these barriers, there has 
been tremendous growth in the number ap-
plied. This is due to the fact already mentioned 
that trade in many products of importance to 
the developed countries themselves is con-
ducted duty-free o rwi the basis of low rates. As 
these are generally consolidated in GATT the 
developed countries are not free to change 
them. In cases like the present, with unem-
ployment sweeping the developed countries, 
resort has been had to the false solution of 
renewed protectionism through non-tariff 
barriers or measures. 
All this superstructure which has now 
been created around protectionism has come 
to be known as "new protectionism", but it is 
actually nothing more than the introduction of 
new forms and modes of protectionism into 
an earlier structure. Among these new forms 
mention may be made of the "voluntary" 
restrictions, the regular marketing agreements, 
the restrictions imposed by means of multi-
lateral agreements which become operational 
once bilateral agreements are reached under 
them (e.g., the multifibre agreements), trigger 
prices in the United States and minimum 
prices in the Community —both currently 
applied to the iron and steel sector— and the 
American Selling Price System in the United 
States. All of these tend euphemistically to be 
called organized free trade or, more correctly, 
condit ioned free trade. If what was said at the 
beginning about the arbitrary application of 
safeguards and countervailing duties is added 
to this, it will give an idea of the instruments 
which restrict access to the markets of the 
industrialized countries. 
Table 3 gives a quantitative picture of 
these barriers for the United States, the Euro-
pean Economic Community and Japan, in 
respect of a sample of products which in 1976 
had a commercial value of 8,196, 8,961 and 
3,117 million dollars respectively. 
Table 3 
NON-TARIFF BARRIERS IDENTIFIED 
FOR PRODUCTS OF EXPORTS 
INTEREST TO LATIN AMERICA IN 1976^ 
rr,
 f . . .. Number of lype or restriction TJÇ . 
Total number of items 
analysed 






























Source: Pedro I. Mendive, op. cit. 
aNot including measures which, although authorized by 
GATT, are at present applied without being subject to its 
rules (such as safeguards and countervailing duties). 
In view of the precarious conditions of 
access which the developed economies offer 
to exports by the developing countries, the 
latter have placed great expectations, first in 
the operation of the generalized systems of 
preferences maintained by the developed 
countries outside the principles of non-dis-
crimination and global reciprocity laid down 
in article I of GATT—an exception arising out 
of a waiver granted under the terms of article 
XXV, paragraph 5 of the General Agreement— 
and secondly, in the multilateral trade negotia-
tions (Tokyo Round) which were held in 
Geneva for almost six years. 
The generalized systems of preferences do 
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not seem to have resulted in any appreciable 
opening-up of markets, owing to the uncer-
tainty over the permanent or non-permanent 
status of the products included in them, the 
safeguards they contain, their maximum limits, 
the complication, difficulty and cost of the 
proof of origin formalities, and the precarious-
ness due to the short period of validity of these 
systems (10 years), even when there is some 
certainty that their expiry dates will be ex-
tended. At all events, relatively little use has 
been made of these systems in practice, and 
they have not contituted any form of escape 
from the protectionism described in the fore-
going pages, one reason being the very nature 
of the products they cover.5 
Thus, for example, in the multilateral 
negotiations referred to above the United 
States not only made no offer under the gen-
eralized system of preferences but in 1979 
eliminated instead a series of products which 
no longer fulfilled the conditions of the com-
petitive need clause and which, according to 
estimates, accounted for some US$ 60 million 
in 1978. The European Economic Community 
(9 countries) made 33 offers, but these only 
lowered the average weighted rate from 18.7% 
before the offer to 18.6% after it, and they only 
referred to chapters 01-24 of the Customs Co-
operation Council Nomenclature, no offers 
being made in respect of manufactures (chap-
ters 25-99). Finally, Japan made only 4 offers, 
which likewise reduced the average rate by a 
very small amount. 
The multilateral trade negotiations, for 
their part, have given very meagre results 
according to the preliminary data published.6 
As regards tariffs, the reductions agreed 
upon by the United States, the EEC and Japan 
in the most-favoured-nation weighted average 
rates for industrial products of -4.5, -3.0 and 
—3.2 units respectively, at import demand 
price elasticities of —2.2, —1.3 and —1.9 and at 
the 1976 value of imports from Latin America 
5According to UNCTAD, the utilization of these 
systems by the countries has been between 15% and 75%. 
In the particular case of Latin America the actual degree 
of utilization is generally nearer the lower figure. 
6
 Although the MTN have now been declared closed, 
their final results have not yet been published. 
would have brought about a growth in such 
exports of US$ 328 million for mat year. As can 
easily be seen, this is only a minimal increase 
if it is compared with the US$ 6 billion worth 
of imports subject to duties out of a sample of 
more than US$ 10 billion. 
This apparent growth in trade, moreover, 
does not take account of the network of non-
tariff barriers now hindering international 
trade. When considering these barriers the 
quantitative restrictions can be said to have 
been practically excluded from the negotia-
tions, and only five codes of conduct7 were 
negotiated to make such trade more efficacious 
in fields where it is restricted by health and 
plant-health barriers, valuations, State pur-
chases, licences and subsidies and counter-
vailing duties. In reality, a summary analysis 
of these codes leads to the conclusion that they 
will merely legalize the practices already 
applied by the developed countries, thus 
giving apparent respectability to the rules of 
the game which such practices involve. 
In addition, according to estimates made 
by the author, more than three-quarters of the 
increase in trade which would have been ex-
perienced in 1976 if all the barriers in question 
had been eliminated would have been due to 
the disappearance of non-tariff barriers, and 
only a quarter to the reduction to 5% of all the 
tariffs above that figure, which is considered not 
to be protectionist but only fiscal. In absolute 
terms, the removal of non-tariff barriers in 1976 
would have promoted an increase in Latin 
America's exports of manufactures (chapters 
25-99) to those countries of around US$ 1,400 
million, while the elimination of all tariffs 
over 5% would have led to an increase in Latin 
American exports of only US$ 420 million. It 
should be noted that these figures include 
certain manufactures —processed foods— 
which appear in chapters 01-24 of the CCC 
Nomenclature. 
If, therefore, the generalized systems of 
preferences, the tariff negotiations and those 
on non-tariff barriers do not lead to an opening-
up of the markets, then the main obstacle to the 
The safeguards code is still being negotiated. 
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export of manufactures by the developing Once again, the conclusion that can be 
countries takes the form of the demand for drawn from this is that it is perfectly legitimate 
manufactures (conditions of access to the mar- for the developing countries to make use of 
kets) and not the supply of such goods. export subsidies. 
IV 
Lines of action 
It is clear from the foregoing pages where the 
main obstacle to exports of Latin American 
manufactures to the world market lies. It is 
also clearly established that the two institu-
tional choices before the countries ofthe region 
—and all developing countries— for the re-
moval of this obstacle were never more than 
empty hopes. The solution to the problem 
must therefore be sought along other lines. 
Various types of partial solutions are analysed 
below, with a view to measuring their effec-
tiveness or alternatively their disadvantages 
or lack of effect. 
The first measure usually proposed is that 
the developing countries should continue with 
import substitution, firstly as a means of retal-
iation against the developed countries and 
secondly as a way of avoiding the accumula-
tion of larger balance-of-payments deficits. 
This measure may prove relatively effective, 
for rather a limited period, in those countries 
which are at the commencement of their manu-
facturing development and still have a broad 
margin of easily substituted imports. But in 
more advanced developing countries where 
these circumstances do not apply, the process 
may be contrary to their economic and social 
interests. As already noted, in addition to 
creating a markedly inefficient industrial struc-
ture, it may lead to the creation of its own 
pitfalls for exports of manufactures by other 
sectors of industry. 
A second measure would be to increase 
trade in manufactures among the countries of 
the developing world. There can be no doubt 
that this trade, which has been growing con-
tinually —at least for some countries— may 
alleviate the problem to some extent. For the 
moment, however, it is limited to certain 
manufactures and almost completely excludes 
those produced by the heavy industries, such 
as capital goods, transport equipment, etc., 
which therefore continue to be supplied by 
the developed countries, creating trade im-
balance not only in terms of the value of the 
trade but also as regards the structure of recip-
rocal demand between developed and devel-
oping countries. 
A third line of action would consist of 
negotiating, both inside and outside GATT, 
to secure the elimination of tariff and non-tariff 
barriers. This argument meets with a major 
difficulty, however, in the difference between 
the bargaining power of the large countries 
vis-à-vis the small countries, taken individual-
ly. It may therefore be doubted whether, even 
if these negotiations prosper, they can achieve 
significant results for the developing countries. 
This was clearly demonstrated in the nego-
tiations which have just ended in Geneva. 
Another line of action lies in taking ad-
vantage ofthe kinds of products least protected 
by the developed countries. In addition to 
confining the developing countries to a limited 
range of goods in developing their industry 
and exports, however, this solution gives rise 
to great uncertainty as to whether even this 
relatively reduced protection can be main-
tained in the future. We saw in earlier pages all 
the superstructure of barriers which the devel-
oped countries started to put up against the 
exports of the developing countries when the 
latter began to flood their markets with com-
petitive goods produced with definite com-
parative advantages. 
There remains the possibility of modifying 
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trade flows by promoting and increasing trade 
with those developed countries with which 
extensive trade links have not yet been estab-
lished. Here there would be room for an 
attempt at some kind of bargaining which 
could secure more liberal mutual trade. 
As may be observed, all the measures 
which have been mentioned offer very little 
guarantee of being the most appropriate. The 
author believes that the solution lies in in-
creasing the bargaining power of the devel-
oping countries, answering protectionism with 
restrictions on access to the vital materials 
which the developing countries possess, using 
the enormous import market constituted by 
the sum of the individual markets to counter 
the restrictions or obstacles created by the 
barriers of the developed countries, and even 
applying within this collective framework ef-
fective measures of retaliation8 to counter the 
effects of the spread of new or old protectionist 
measures, etc.9 
All this calls for thé mounting of an ef-
s This is a measure proposed by important Latin 
American personages who attended a seminar on protec-
tionism, held in Buenos Aires from 31 October to 3 
November 1978, which was organized by CEPAL and 
U N D P under the auspices of the Government of Argen-
tina. See the report of this meeting in document E/CEPAL/ 
1057. 
"Many of these measures are illegal within GATT, 
since they were not accepted by the organization when 
the country joined GATT or do not arise out of a waiver 
(see Article XXV). 
ficient and rapid system of information and 
action among the developing countries, 
making use, in Latin America at least, of the 
assistance which can be provided by the Latin 
American groups in Brussels, Geneva, New 
York, and in CECON in Washington. Along 
with these groups of government represen-
tatives, mention may be made of the interna-
tional organizations with competence in the 
interregional and the various regional contexts, 
which can provide the necessary elements of 
analysis to serve as a basis for measures and 
decisions by the developing countries and to 
be used as elements for negotiation. 
In reality, a system can be envisaged with 
three operative mechanisms. The first of these 
would be an information and consultation 
mechanism, in which only the Latin American 
countries would participate. The second 
mechanism would be made up of both devel-
oped and developing countries: it would settle 
differences that might arise in the information, 
and consultation stage, and its decisions could 
be either legally or merely morally binding.10 
Finally, the third mechanism would form a 
kind of supervisory body which would watch 
over the implementation of the agreements 
reached in the dispute-solving mechanism. 
1 0Perhaps the best thing would be to lay down or 
agree on "equivalent compensation measures" which 
would be taken whenever there was any transgression of 
the established rules: i.e., whenever there was any attempt 
to bring back protectionism. 
